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- From 3a223ca3ebc7ac24d7726a0cd58e5695bc813657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 21:00:47 +0100
- Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-5704: Prevent some forms of Cross Protocol Scripting
- attacks
- OpenOCD can be targeted by a Cross Protocol Scripting attack from
- a web browser running malicious code, such as the following PoC:
- var x = new XMLHttpRequest();
- x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:4444", true);
- x.send("exec xcalc\r\n");
- This mitigation should provide some protection from browser-based
- attacks and is based on the corresponding fix in Redis:
- https://github.com/antirez/redis/blob/8075572207b5aebb1385c4f233f5302544439325/src/networking.c#L1758
- Upstream-status: Under review: http://openocd.zylin.com/#/c/4335/
- Change-Id: Ia96ebe19b74b5805dc228bf7364c7971a90a4581
- Signed-off-by: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
- Reported-by: Josef Gajdusek <atx@atx.name>
- Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
- ---
- src/server/startup.tcl | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
- diff --git a/src/server/startup.tcl b/src/server/startup.tcl
- index 64ace407..dd1b31e4 100644
- --- a/src/server/startup.tcl
- +++ b/src/server/startup.tcl
- @@ -8,3 +8,14 @@ proc ocd_gdb_restart {target_id} {
- # one target
- reset halt
- }
- +
- +proc prevent_cps {} {
- + echo "Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected."
- + echo "It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to OpenOCD."
- + echo "This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting"
- + echo "to compromise your OpenOCD instance. Connection aborted."
- + exit
- +}
- +
- +proc POST {args} { prevent_cps }
- +proc Host: {args} { prevent_cps }
- --
- 2.11.0
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