Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces

Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.

This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.

If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.

Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.

Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.

sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

security/smack/smack.h

@@ -90,9 +90,15 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_floor;
 	struct smack_known	*smk_hat;
 	struct smack_known	*smk_default;
-	int			smk_initialized;
+	int			smk_flags;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Superblock flags
+ */
+#define SMK_SB_INITIALIZED	0x01
+#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED	0x02
+
 struct socket_smack {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
 	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
 	/*
-	 * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
+	 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
 	 */
 	sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
@@ -766,10 +766,10 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 	int transmute = 0;
 
-	if (sp->smk_initialized)
+	if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
 		return 0;
 
-	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
+	sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 		switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
@@ -821,6 +821,17 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		skp = smk_of_current();
 		sp->smk_root = skp;
 		sp->smk_default = skp;
+		/*
+		 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
+		 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
+		 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
+		 */
+		if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+		    sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+		    sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
+			transmute = 1;
+			sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1203,6 +1214,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
  */
 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
 	int rc;
@@ -1214,6 +1226,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (mask == 0)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
+		if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/* May be droppable after audit */
 	if (no_block)
 		return -ECHILD;
@@ -3529,14 +3546,16 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		/*
-		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
-		 */
-		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-		    skp == &smack_known_web)
-			skp = NULL;
-		isp->smk_task = skp;
+		if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
+			/*
+			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+			 */
+			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+			    skp == &smack_known_web)
+				skp = NULL;
+			isp->smk_task = skp;
+		}
 
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||