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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
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*
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* This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
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*
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- * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
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+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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* Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
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* Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
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* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
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@@ -815,7 +815,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
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if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
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!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
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!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
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- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
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+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
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+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
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+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
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sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
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if (!sbsec->behavior) {
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@@ -1303,6 +1305,7 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
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case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
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return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
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case SOCK_DGRAM:
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+ case SOCK_RAW:
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return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
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}
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break;
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@@ -2317,6 +2320,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
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int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
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int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
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int rc;
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+ u32 av;
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if (!nnp && !nosuid)
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return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
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@@ -2325,24 +2329,40 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
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return 0; /* No change in credentials */
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/*
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- * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
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- * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
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- * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
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- * of the current SID.
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+ * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
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+ * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
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+ * policy allows the corresponding permission between
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+ * the old and new contexts.
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*/
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- rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
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- if (rc) {
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- /*
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- * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
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- * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
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- * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
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- */
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+ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
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+ av = 0;
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if (nnp)
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- return -EPERM;
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- else
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- return -EACCES;
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+ av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
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+ if (nosuid)
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+ av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
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+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
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+ SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
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+ if (!rc)
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+ return 0;
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}
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- return 0;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
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+ * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
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+ * of the permissions of the current SID.
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+ */
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+ rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
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+ if (!rc)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
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+ * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
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+ * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
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+ */
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+ if (nnp)
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+ return -EPERM;
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+ return -EACCES;
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}
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static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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