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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
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* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
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+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
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+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
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* All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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@@ -27,11 +29,22 @@
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* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
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* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
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*
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+ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
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+ * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
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+ *
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+ * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
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+ * filesystem information.
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+ *
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+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
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+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <asm/types.h>
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#include <asm/atomic.h>
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+#include <asm/types.h>
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+#include <linux/fs.h>
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+#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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@@ -39,16 +52,16 @@
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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-#include <linux/kthread.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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+#include <linux/security.h>
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+#include <linux/list.h>
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+#include <linux/tty.h>
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+
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+#include "audit.h"
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-/* 0 = no checking
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- 1 = put_count checking
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- 2 = verbose put_count checking
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-*/
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-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
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+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
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/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
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extern int audit_enabled;
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@@ -62,29 +75,6 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
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* path_lookup. */
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#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
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-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
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- a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
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- the syscall filter. */
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-enum audit_state {
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- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
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- * No syscall-specific audit records can
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- * be generated. */
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- AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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- * but don't necessarily fill it in at
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- * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
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- * instead). */
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- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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- * and always fill it in at syscall
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- * entry time. This makes a full
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- * syscall record available if some
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- * other part of the kernel decides it
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- * should be recorded. */
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- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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- * always fill it in at syscall entry
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- * time, and always write out the audit
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- * record at syscall exit time. */
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-};
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-
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/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
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* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
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* pointers at syscall exit time).
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@@ -93,12 +83,13 @@ enum audit_state {
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struct audit_names {
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const char *name;
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unsigned long ino;
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+ unsigned long pino;
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dev_t dev;
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umode_t mode;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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dev_t rdev;
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- unsigned flags;
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+ char *ctx;
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};
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struct audit_aux_data {
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@@ -115,6 +106,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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mode_t mode;
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+ char *ctx;
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};
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struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
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@@ -167,290 +159,72 @@ struct audit_context {
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#endif
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};
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- /* Public API */
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-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
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- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
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- * syscall exit time. */
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-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
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- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
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- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
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- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
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- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
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- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
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-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
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-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
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-#endif
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-};
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-
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-struct audit_entry {
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- struct list_head list;
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- struct rcu_head rcu;
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- struct audit_rule rule;
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-};
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-
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-extern int audit_pid;
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-
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-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
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- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
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-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
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-{
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- int i;
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-
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- if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
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- && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
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- && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
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- return -1;
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- if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
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- return -1;
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- if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
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- return -1;
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-
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- d->flags = s->flags;
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- d->action = s->action;
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- d->field_count = s->field_count;
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- for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
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- d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
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- d->values[i] = s->values[i];
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- }
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- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
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- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
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- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
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-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
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-{
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- int i;
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-
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- if (a->flags != b->flags)
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- return 1;
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-
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- if (a->action != b->action)
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- return 1;
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-
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- if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
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- return 1;
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
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- if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
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- || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
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- return 1;
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- }
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-
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- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
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- if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
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- return 1;
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-
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
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- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
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- * audit_netlink_sem. */
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-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
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- struct list_head *list)
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-{
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- struct audit_entry *entry;
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-
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- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
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- * addition routine. */
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- list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
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- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
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- return -EEXIST;
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- }
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- }
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-
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- if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
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- return -ENOMEM;
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- if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
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- kfree(entry);
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- return -EINVAL;
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- }
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-
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- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
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- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
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- } else {
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- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
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- }
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-
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
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-{
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- struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
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- kfree(e);
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-}
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-
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-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
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- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
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- * audit_netlink_sem. */
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-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
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- struct list_head *list)
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-{
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- struct audit_entry *e;
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-
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- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
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- * deletion routine. */
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- list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
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- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
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- list_del_rcu(&e->list);
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- call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
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- return 0;
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- }
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- }
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- return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
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-}
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-
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-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
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-{
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- int pid, seq;
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- int *dest = _dest;
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- struct audit_entry *entry;
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- int i;
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-
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- pid = dest[0];
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- seq = dest[1];
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- kfree(dest);
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-
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- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
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-
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- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
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- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
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- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
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- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
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- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
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- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
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- }
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- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
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-
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- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
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- uid_t loginuid)
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-{
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- struct task_struct *tsk;
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- int *dest;
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- int err = 0;
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- unsigned listnr;
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-
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- switch (type) {
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- case AUDIT_LIST:
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- /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
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- * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
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- * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
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- * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
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- * trying to _send_ the stuff */
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-
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- dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
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- if (!dest)
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- return -ENOMEM;
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- dest[0] = pid;
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- dest[1] = seq;
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-
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- tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
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- if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
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- kfree(dest);
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- err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
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- }
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- break;
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- case AUDIT_ADD:
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- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
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- return -EINVAL;
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-
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- err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
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- if (!err)
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- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
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- "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
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- break;
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- case AUDIT_DEL:
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- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
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- return -EINVAL;
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-
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- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
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- if (!err)
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- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
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- "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
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- break;
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- default:
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- return -EINVAL;
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- }
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-
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- return err;
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-}
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/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
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* otherwise. */
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static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
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- struct audit_rule *rule,
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+ struct audit_krule *rule,
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struct audit_context *ctx,
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enum audit_state *state)
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{
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int i, j;
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for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
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- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
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- u32 value = rule->values[i];
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+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
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int result = 0;
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- switch (field) {
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+ switch (f->type) {
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case AUDIT_PID:
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- result = (tsk->pid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_UID:
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- result = (tsk->uid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EUID:
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- result = (tsk->euid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SUID:
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- result = (tsk->suid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_FSUID:
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- result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_GID:
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- result = (tsk->gid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EGID:
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- result = (tsk->egid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SGID:
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- result = (tsk->sgid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_FSGID:
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- result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_PERS:
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- result = (tsk->personality == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_ARCH:
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- if (ctx)
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- result = (ctx->arch == value);
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+ if (ctx)
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+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_EXIT:
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if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
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- result = (ctx->return_code == value);
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+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
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break;
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case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
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if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
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- if (value)
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- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
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+ if (f->val)
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|
|
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
- if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
|
|
|
+ if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -460,7 +234,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
- if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
|
|
|
+ if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -470,7 +244,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
case AUDIT_INODE:
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
- if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
|
|
|
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
|
|
|
+ audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -480,19 +255,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
- result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
|
|
|
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG0:
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG1:
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG2:
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG3:
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
- result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
|
|
|
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
|
|
|
- result = !result;
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -527,7 +300,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
|
|
|
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
|
|
|
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
|
|
|
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
|
|
|
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
@@ -541,77 +314,19 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(list)) {
|
|
|
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
|
|
|
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
|
|
|
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
|
|
|
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
|
|
|
- rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
- return state;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
- return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
|
|
|
- struct audit_rule *rule,
|
|
|
- enum audit_state *state)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
|
|
|
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
|
|
|
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
|
|
|
- int result = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- switch (field) {
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_PID:
|
|
|
- result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_UID:
|
|
|
- result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_GID:
|
|
|
- result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
|
- result = (cb->loginuid == value);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
|
|
|
- result = !result;
|
|
|
- if (!result)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- switch (rule->action) {
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
|
|
|
- case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
|
- enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
- int ret = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
|
|
|
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
|
|
|
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
|
|
|
- ret = 0;
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
|
|
|
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
|
|
|
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
|
|
|
+ && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
|
|
|
+ rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
+ return state;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return ret; /* Audit by default */
|
|
|
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
|
|
|
@@ -654,17 +369,18 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
|
if (context->auditable
|
|
|
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
|
|
|
- printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
|
|
|
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
|
|
|
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
|
|
|
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
|
|
|
- __LINE__,
|
|
|
+ __FILE__, __LINE__,
|
|
|
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
|
|
|
context->name_count, context->put_count,
|
|
|
context->ino_count);
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
|
|
|
context->names[i].name,
|
|
|
- context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -674,9 +390,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
context->ino_count = 0;
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
|
|
|
+ char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
+ kfree(p);
|
|
|
if (context->names[i].name)
|
|
|
__putname(context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
context->name_count = 0;
|
|
|
if (context->pwd)
|
|
|
dput(context->pwd);
|
|
|
@@ -696,6 +416,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
dput(axi->dentry);
|
|
|
mntput(axi->mnt);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
|
|
|
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
+ if (axi->ctx)
|
|
|
+ kfree(axi->ctx);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
context->aux = aux->next;
|
|
|
kfree(aux);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
@@ -721,10 +447,15 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
|
|
|
return context;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
|
|
|
+ * @tsk: task
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
|
|
|
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
|
|
|
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
|
|
|
- * needed. */
|
|
|
+ * needed.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
@@ -775,7 +506,37 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
|
|
|
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
+ ssize_t len = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0) {
|
|
|
+ if (len != -EINVAL)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
|
|
|
+ if (!ctx)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0 )
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+error_path:
|
|
|
+ if (ctx)
|
|
|
+ kfree(ctx);
|
|
|
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
@@ -788,6 +549,10 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
|
|
|
if (!mm)
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
|
|
|
+ * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
vma = mm->mmap;
|
|
|
while (vma) {
|
|
|
@@ -801,6 +566,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
|
|
|
vma = vma->vm_next;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
+ audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
@@ -808,6 +574,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
|
|
|
+ const char *tty;
|
|
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
|
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
|
@@ -820,11 +587,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
|
|
|
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
|
|
|
context->return_code);
|
|
|
+ if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
|
|
|
+ tty = current->signal->tty->name;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ tty = "(none)";
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
|
|
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
|
|
|
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
|
|
|
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
|
|
|
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
|
|
|
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
|
|
|
context->argv[0],
|
|
|
context->argv[1],
|
|
|
context->argv[2],
|
|
|
@@ -835,8 +606,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
context->uid,
|
|
|
context->gid,
|
|
|
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
|
|
|
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
|
|
|
- audit_log_task_info(ab);
|
|
|
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
|
|
|
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
|
|
|
@@ -849,8 +620,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
case AUDIT_IPC: {
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
|
|
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
|
|
|
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
|
|
|
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
|
|
|
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
|
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
|
|
|
@@ -885,42 +656,62 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
|
|
|
+ unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
|
|
|
+ unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
|
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
|
|
|
- if (context->names[i].name) {
|
|
|
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
|
|
|
+ if (context->names[i].name)
|
|
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
|
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
|
|
|
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
|
|
|
- context->names[i].ino,
|
|
|
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
- context->names[i].mode,
|
|
|
- context->names[i].uid,
|
|
|
- context->names[i].gid,
|
|
|
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
|
|
|
+ if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
|
|
|
+ if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
|
|
|
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
|
|
|
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].mode,
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].uid,
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].gid,
|
|
|
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
|
|
|
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
|
|
|
+ if (context->names[i].ctx) {
|
|
|
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].ctx);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
|
|
|
- * __put_task_struct. */
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
|
|
|
+ * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- task_lock(tsk);
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
|
|
|
+ * then the task has no external references anymore, and
|
|
|
+ * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
|
|
|
+ * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
|
|
|
+ * contexts as well, via RCU.)
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
|
|
|
- task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -934,13 +725,24 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
audit_free_context(context);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
|
|
|
+ * @tsk: task being audited
|
|
|
+ * @arch: architecture type
|
|
|
+ * @major: major syscall type (function)
|
|
|
+ * @a1: additional syscall register 1
|
|
|
+ * @a2: additional syscall register 2
|
|
|
+ * @a3: additional syscall register 3
|
|
|
+ * @a4: additional syscall register 4
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
|
|
|
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
|
|
|
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
|
|
|
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
|
|
|
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
|
|
|
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
|
|
|
- * be written). */
|
|
|
+ * be written).
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
|
|
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
|
|
|
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
|
|
|
@@ -950,7 +752,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
|
|
|
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
|
|
|
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
|
|
|
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
|
|
|
@@ -966,11 +769,6 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall) {
|
|
|
struct audit_context *newctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
|
|
|
- /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
|
|
|
- if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR
|
|
|
"audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
|
|
|
@@ -1014,11 +812,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
|
|
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
|
|
|
+ * @tsk: task being audited
|
|
|
+ * @valid: success/failure flag
|
|
|
+ * @return_code: syscall return value
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
|
|
|
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
|
|
|
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
|
|
|
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
|
|
|
- * free the names stored from getname(). */
|
|
|
+ * free the names stored from getname().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
@@ -1053,7 +858,13 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
|
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_getname - add a name to the list
|
|
|
+ * @name: name to add
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
|
|
|
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void audit_getname(const char *name)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
@@ -1082,10 +893,13 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
|
|
|
- * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
|
|
|
- * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
|
|
|
- * exit. */
|
|
|
+/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
|
|
|
+ * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
|
|
|
+ * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
|
|
|
+ * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void audit_putname(const char *name)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
@@ -1100,7 +914,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
|
|
|
context->names[i].name,
|
|
|
- context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
__putname(name);
|
|
|
@@ -1122,9 +936,52 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
|
|
|
- * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
|
|
|
-void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
|
|
|
+void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
+ const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
|
|
|
+ char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
+ int len = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!suffix)
|
|
|
+ goto ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
|
+ goto ret;
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
+ if (!ctx)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
+ goto ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+error_path:
|
|
|
+ if (ctx)
|
|
|
+ kfree(ctx);
|
|
|
+ audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
|
|
|
+ret:
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
|
|
|
+ * @name: name being audited
|
|
|
+ * @inode: inode being audited
|
|
|
+ * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
int idx;
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
@@ -1150,15 +1007,105 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
|
|
|
++context->ino_count;
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- context->names[idx].flags = flags;
|
|
|
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
|
|
|
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
|
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
|
|
|
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
|
|
|
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
|
|
|
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
|
|
|
+ if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
|
|
|
+ (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
|
|
|
+ * @dname: inode's dentry name
|
|
|
+ * @inode: inode being audited
|
|
|
+ * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
|
|
|
+ * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
|
|
|
+ * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
|
|
|
+ * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
|
|
|
+ * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
|
|
|
+ * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
|
|
|
+ * unsuccessful attempts.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
+ unsigned long pino)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ int idx;
|
|
|
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!context->in_syscall)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* determine matching parent */
|
|
|
+ if (dname)
|
|
|
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
|
|
|
+ if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
|
|
|
+ const char *n;
|
|
|
+ const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
|
|
|
+ int dlen = strlen(dname);
|
|
|
+ int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (nlen < dlen)
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* disregard trailing slashes */
|
|
|
+ n = name + nlen - 1;
|
|
|
+ while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
|
|
|
+ n--;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* find last path component */
|
|
|
+ n = n - dlen + 1;
|
|
|
+ if (n < name)
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ else if (n > name) {
|
|
|
+ if (*--n != '/')
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ n++;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
|
|
|
+ goto update_context;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* catch-all in case match not found */
|
|
|
+ idx = context->name_count++;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].name = NULL;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].pino = pino;
|
|
|
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
+ context->ino_count++;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+update_context:
|
|
|
+ if (inode) {
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
|
|
|
+ context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
|
|
|
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
|
|
|
+ * @ctx: audit_context for the task
|
|
|
+ * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
|
|
|
+ * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Also sets the context as auditable.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
@@ -1170,6 +1117,15 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
ctx->auditable = 1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
|
|
|
+ * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
|
|
|
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Returns 0.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
if (task->audit_context) {
|
|
|
@@ -1188,12 +1144,59 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
|
|
|
+ * @ctx: the audit_context
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
+static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
+ char *ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
+ int len = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
|
+ goto ret;
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
+ if (!ctx)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
|
|
|
+ if (len < 0)
|
|
|
+ goto error_path;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ctx;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+error_path:
|
|
|
+ kfree(ctx);
|
|
|
+ audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
|
|
|
+ret:
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
|
|
|
+ * @qbytes: msgq bytes
|
|
|
+ * @uid: msgq user id
|
|
|
+ * @gid: msgq group id
|
|
|
+ * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
@@ -1201,7 +1204,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -1209,6 +1212,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
ax->uid = uid;
|
|
|
ax->gid = gid;
|
|
|
ax->mode = mode;
|
|
|
+ ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
|
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
|
@@ -1216,6 +1220,13 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
|
|
|
+ * @nargs: number of args
|
|
|
+ * @args: args array
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
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{
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struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
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@@ -1237,6 +1248,13 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
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return 0;
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}
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+/**
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+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
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+ * @len: data length in user space
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+ * @a: data address in kernel space
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+ *
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+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
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+ */
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int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
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{
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struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
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@@ -1258,6 +1276,15 @@ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
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return 0;
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}
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+/**
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+ * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
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+ * @dentry: dentry to record
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+ * @mnt: mnt to record
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+ *
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+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
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+ *
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+ * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
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+ */
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int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
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{
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struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
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@@ -1279,6 +1306,14 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
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return 0;
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}
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+/**
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+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
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+ * @sig: signal value
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+ * @t: task being signaled
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+ *
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+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
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+ * and uid that is doing that.
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+ */
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void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
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{
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extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
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@@ -1295,4 +1330,3 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
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}
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}
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}
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-
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Linus Torvalds